This title provides an overview of the atomic nucleus and the theories that seek to explain it. Bringing together a systematic explanation of hadrons, nuclei, and stars for the first time, the author provides the core material needed by students of physics to acquire a solid understanding of nuclear and particle science.

Shadows are intriguing phenomena. They do not have mass or energy. So, they are unable to have some basic characteristics of the objects of which they are shadows: they cannot move by themselves and they cannot experience the same kind of changes. At first sight, any theory of perception can skip this optical phenomenon or look at it only as a side-effect. Actually, in order to be seen objects must be illuminated and one of the consequences of this is that (...) they project a shadow over the surrounding space. Is that all? In this paper I will argue that, from a phenomenological point of view (or at least from a Husserlian oriented phenomenology), shadows, with their specific hyletic data, must be considered as an element of the process of constitution of spatial-temporal objectivities. In other words, shadows no less than other predicates, like extension or hardness, although in a different manner, belong to the a priori structure of those objectivities. This means that their ontological status is quite different from that of fictitious objects or hallucinations. To show this I will draw mainly in Husserl’s Lesson Thing and Space, from 1907, and other unpublished texts during Husserl’s lifetime, like the second volume of the Ideas and the Lesson of 1925 on Psychological Phenomenology. (shrink)

En esta nota, el autor recuerda cómo Santo Tomás de Aquino se ha ocupado del problema de los universales, señala los textos más importantes en que aborda tal cuestión y formula algunas observaciones en torno a ellos. Finalmente, traduce al portugués uno de estos textos.

This book recovers Dionysus and Apollo as the twin conceptual personae of life's dual rhythm in an attempt to redesign contemporary theory through the reciprocal affirmation of event and form, earth and world, dance and philosophy.

Este texto elabora un análisis metodológico y político de lo que implica pensar el discurso de los movimientos sociales en Colombia como lugar para comprender el conflicto político. Ello implica comenzar por una reflexión sobre lo que está juego en la política del lenguaje en la coyuntura histórica de lo que se ha dado en llamar la posverdad. Ante el reto de esta coyuntura, se propone la perspectiva de una ontología de lo político de corte posestructuralista como vía para articular (...) otros modos de comprender y ejercitar la veracidad y la responsabilidad en las prácticas del lenguaje. Siguiendo una relectura de la polémica dirigida por Habermas en contra de Foucault, y luego una interpretación de la lectura de Marx elaborada por Derrida, se propone una figura de la promesa, inseparable de la historicidad del lenguaje, como clave para pensar otros modos de la veracidad y la responsabilidad ético-política. Es desde esta otra figura de la promesa como configuradora de lo político, que se define la necesidad de una práctica teórico-filosófica del pensar-con las formas de enunciación de los movimientos y colectivos populares. (shrink)

It is proposed that there are at least two categories of blindsight. One is present in visually guided behaviour in normals as well as in brain-damaged patients, while the other is present only following cortical lesions. It is also proposed that blindsight is blind because residual visual functions are banned from consciousness either when they are subserved by subcortical centres alone or when they are mediated by cortical areas that have never been exclusively associated with such functions before brain injury.

This paper deals with the relationship between divine knowledge and sense experience and the first three Thomistic ways to prove the existence of God. It reinforces the ways in the light of contributions and critiques coming from the realist-phenomenological and the analytic perspectives. To this end, it examines the insights of an important author of each of these two traditions, Josef Seifert and Richard Swinburne.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 224 Seiten: 1-17.

Este artículo examina algunos de los problemas que presenta el tratamiento lógico de las obligaciones prima facie en la obra de Carlos Alchourrón. Por una parte, señalaremos que su sistema para los condicionales derrotables DFT no formaliza adecuadamente la noción intuitiva de condición contribuyente que Alchourrón utiliza para elucidar la de condicional derrotable. Por otra parte, argumentaremos que la noción de deber prima facie de David Ross no queda adecuadamente formalizada en el sistema AD de lógica deóntica que Alchourrón (...) construye como una extensión de DFT. This paper deals with some problems concerning the logical treatment of prima facie obligations in the work of Carlos Alchourrón. On the one hand, we will argue that his DFT system for defeasible conditionals does not adequately formalize the intuitive notion of contributory condition used by Alchourrón to elucidate the notion of defeasible conditional. On the other hand, we will argue that David Ross' notion of prima facie duty is not adequately formalized in Alchourrón' s deontic system AD, an extension of his DFT logic. (shrink)

This paper introduces a technique for measuring the degree of (in)coherence of inconsistent sets of propositional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal models of those sets in G. Priest's Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique. In this way, Hunter's objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring (in)coherence are addressed.

It is usually accepted in the literature that negation is a contradictory-forming operator and that two statements are contradictories if and only if it is logically impossible for both to be true and logically impossible for both to be false. These two premises have been used by Hartley Slater [Slater, 1995] to argue that paraconsistent negation is not a “real” negation because a sentence and its paraconsistent negation can be true together. In this paper we claim that a counterpart of (...) Slater´s argument can be directed against the negation operator of classical logic. Carnap’s discovery that there are models of classical propositional logic with non-standard or non-normal interpretations of the connectives will be used to build such an argument. One such non-normal valuation which can be added to the set of classically admissible valuations without altering the set of theorems or the set of valid consequences assigns true to every well-formed formula and, therefore, assigns a designated value to every formula and its negation. We ponder the consequences of these arguments for the claims that paraconsistent negations are not genuine negations and that the negation of classical logic is a contradictory-forming operator. (shrink)

Este escrito considera y distingue dos objeciones que de ordinario se piensa que se dirigen contra una concepción ética realista: la falacia naturalista de G. E. Moore y la ley de Hume. Después de haber expuesto ambas objeciones, desplegado sus supuestos y consecuencias y respondido a todos ellos, concluye que es posible hoy sostener una ética realista. Se estructura a la manera de una cuestión disputada, dividida en seis artículos.

Este artículo muestra que el método adecuado de la disciplina jurídica es un método tópico, debido a la naturaleza práctica de la disciplina. Desde allí arroja luz sobre el problema de las lagunas legales. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, se esfuerza en mostrar que no equivale afirmar el carácter tópico de la disciplina y aceptar el activismo judicial que ha introducido la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos en la interpretación-creación del Derecho Constitucional y que ha llegado al (...) paroxismo en la escuela del uso alternativo del Derecho. (shrink)

Ancient monism matters today because it reveals an alternative answer to a problem faced by ontology “after the death of god,” namely, how to distinguish between good and bad actions after the disappearance of transcendence. The modern answer in Continental philosophy was systematized by Heidegger and consists in positing that the everyday is permeated by instrumentality whereas there is a different kind of action that is noninstrumental, such as art or the thinking of being. By contrast, ancient monism holds that (...) all actions are instrumental and employs on a typology of action that relies on the distinction between techne and phronesis. Recognizing a different answer from the dominant Heideggerian one has the potential to renew the conception of the ethical and the political in Continental philosophy. (shrink)

As much in the processes of education of sciences like in the methodological and epistemological analyses, usually are not examples of social theories that they allow to show how they are resisted with the experience. This work tries to show not only the methodological skeleton used by E. Durkheim i..

Las nociones de "uno" y de "múltiple" han sido, históricamente, objeto de tratamiento, a la vez, filosófico y teológico. En el contexto de la filosofía islámica oriental, y en el marco de su vertiente más específicamente neoplatónica, el "Príncipe de los Teósofos", Sadrâ ¿irâzi (ob.1050/1640), estudia ambas desde una perspectiva ontológica y distanciándose del enfoque consignado al respecto por los filósofos peripatéticos del Islam. Adaptando y continuando, de un lado, la gnosis de Ibn al-'ArabÌ, y, de otro, la sabiduría iluminativa (...) de Sohravardi, Mollâ Sadrâ discute la distinción aviceniana entre un Ser Necesario y una multiplicidad de seres posibles, así como la posibilidad de considerar accidental la realidad de la existencia. Basado en la coimplicación de tres conceptos fundamentales: iîªlat al-wuÿñd (prioridad del ser), waÊdat al-wuÿñd (unidad del ser) y ta¿kÌk (diferenciación y gradación intensiva del ser), el univocismo monadológico de Sadrâ puede, por otra parte, permitirnos reevaluar ciertas cuestiones filosóficas que pugnan por ser examinadas hoy a una nueva luz. (shrink)

1. Ser y estar -- 2. Ciencia y sabiduría-- 3. Yo y nosotros.

This paper first expounds the Aristotelian conception of universals. Afterwards, it determines (a) that in the metaphysics of the Stagirite there is place for divine Ideas as archetypes, and (b) which are the relations that exist between things and Ideas. It concludes, in the light of the above, with a reconsideration of the Aristotelian critique of Plato’s theory of anamnesis.

El artículo muestra que el hombre obtiene las especies inteligibles a partir de lo sensible por la acción del intelecto agente. También, que en el juicio se da un paso desde las especies hacia la cosa, hecho posible a causa de un contacto espiritual que es la intencionalidad intelectiva, que trasciende las especies. Ese contacto con la cosa ocurre gracias a la información de los sentidos por el intelecto. En esta vida, toda elevación del alma a lo puramente espiritual se (...) da a partir del conocimiento sensible. Pero es posible dicha elevación porque la mente participa de la Verdad eterna, como se hace patente en la inmaterialidad de los conceptos y en la formación de los principios naturales del entendimiento. (shrink)

Ernst Bloch formulated problems of enormous philosophical and human relevance. He held that in our contemporary situation we have but two questions concerning the fundamental direction of our lives and history: we must choose, first, between hopeless nihilism and transcendent hope; and, second, between transcendent hope with transcendence and transcendent hope without transcendence. Bloch opted for the transcendent hope without transcendence and formulated a hard critique of hope with transcendence. Josef Pieper and Bernard Schumacher have offered a competent response to (...) Bloch from the Catholic perspective. However, we offer here a little explored aspect of the problem by demonstrating that Bloch’s metaphysical arguments do not consider that (a) a material reality necessarily has the concrete potentiality of dissolving, and (b) therefore, left to itself, it will dissolve necessarily in infinite time; and that (c) no effect can have a reality disproportionate to its cause, which is the reason why (d) no immortal reality can proceed from mortal reality without the intervention of a higher cause. (shrink)